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Abstract
Size is an important visuo-spatial characteristic of the physical world. In language processing, previous research has
demonstrated a processing advantage for words denoting semantically ‘‘big’’ (e.g., jungle) versus ‘‘small’’ (e.g., needle)
concrete objects. We investigated whether semantic size plays a role in the recognition of words expressing abstract
concepts (e.g., truth). Semantically ‘‘big’’ and ‘‘small’’ concrete and abstract words were presented in a lexical decision task.
Responses to ‘‘big’’ words, regardless of their concreteness, were faster than those to ‘‘small’’ words. Critically, we explored
the relationship between semantic size and affective characteristics of words as well as their influence on lexical access.
Although a word’s semantic size was correlated with its emotional arousal, the temporal locus of arousal effects may
depend on the level of concreteness. That is, arousal seemed to have an earlier (lexical) effect on abstract words, but a later
(post-lexical) effect on concrete words. Our findings provide novel insights into the semantic representations of size in
abstract concepts and highlight that affective attributes of words may not always index lexical access.
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Introduction
Size is one of the most important properties of the physical
world. Size affects the physics and biology of the world around us
(e.g., [1,2]). Size is one of the few dimensions that is iconically
gestured during spontaneous speech (e.g., [3]). Recent advances in
visual neuroscience have demonstrated category selectivity for
object size along the ventral temporal cortex (e.g., [4]). While there
is robust evidence that humans possess perceptual (e.g., visual)
systems specialized for the processing of physical or ‘‘real-world’’
size, the involvement of these systems in language processing
remains less well understood.
There is a growing body of evidence, however, suggesting that
the semantic representation of physical size is automatically
activated during visual word recognition. Rubinsten and Henik [5]
demonstrated a size-congruency effect for animal name pairs that
were visually presented in different font sizes (e.g., ANT-LION or
ANT-LION). Participants judged which of the two words was larger
in either physical or semantic size. In both judgments, reaction
times (RTs) were faster with size-congruent (ANT-LION) versus size-
incongruent (ANT-LION) stimuli. Their findings indicated that
lexically-associated size information interacted with the perception
of physical size. Sereno, O’Donnell, and Sereno [6,7] further
explored semantic size effects during lexical access. Using a lexical
decision task, they observed that individuals were faster to
recognize words representing big (e.g., ocean, dinosaur, cathedral) as
opposed to small (e.g., apple, parasite, cigarette) items. Their findings
suggested that size representations seem to be both automatically
activated and differentially accessed.
Recent embodied or grounded cognition theories (e.g., [8])
provide a possible mechanism underlying the processing
advantage for words with bigger semantic sizes. Such theories
posit that there is an inextricable link between cognition and
sensory-motor systems. According to these theories, language
processing of words is thought to be grounded in mental
simulations of semantically associated visuo-spatial representa-
tions. We would suggest that part of such representations must
relate to real-world size, reflected by differential activations
within the human visual system. For example, Murray, Boyaci,
and Kersten [9] demonstrated that the degree of primary visual
cortex activation depended on the perceived, not actual, size of
a stimulus. Moreover, when viewed from the same distance,
larger (as opposed to smaller) objects elicit more low spatial-
frequency information which is transmitted faster through the
magnocellular pathway (e.g., [10]). In word recognition, such
information may become available faster via mental simulation
for words representing larger objects, leading to a processing
advantage over words representing smaller objects.
While representations of the semantic size of concrete objects can
be embodied in visuo-spatial sensory processing, it is uncertain
what can account for semantic size representations of abstract
concepts. Unlike their concrete cousins, abstract concepts are not
directly linked to our sensory-motor experiences of the physical
world. Nonetheless, they can often be characterized in terms of
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size. Intuitively, we would classify concepts like trust, eternal, and
crisis as ‘‘big’’, and ones like trace, impulse and humble as ‘‘small’’.
A concept’s size can also vary depending on the context, as
indicated in statements like, ‘‘This is the biggest moment in my life’’
or ‘‘I like big ideas’’. The question remains, however, as to the
representational nature of abstract size in language processing.
The word moment does not refer to a physical entity and its size
cannot be grounded in sensory-motor experiences in the same
way as that of the word horse can. In this sense, the concept
moment is neither big nor small.
Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings [11] extended their account of
knowledge representations to abstract concepts by suggesting that
abstract meanings are captured in a repertoire of situational events
and introspections. They proposed that while concrete concepts
focus on objects in specific situations, abstract concepts rely on a
broader range of components including introspective information
such as emotions. This idea was recently supported and extended
by Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, and Del Campo [12].
They suggested that abstract concepts are more emotionally
charged than concrete ones, which gives the former a residual
processing advantage when imageability and contextual availabil-
ity are controlled. They proposed that emotion plays an important
role in acquiring, representing, and processing abstract concepts
and that the lack of mappings from abstract words to the physical
world is compensated for by internal mappings in the form of
affective associations. Consequently, it is plausible to posit that the
concept of size for abstract words may be represented through
such affective associations. It is widely accepted that emotion can
be characterized in a two-dimensional framework of arousal and
valence (e.g., [13–16]). Arousal is a physiological and psychological
state of alertness that varies in magnitude with the intensity of the
experience. Valence indexes the inherent attractiveness or
aversiveness of an entity and describes the polarity (positive or
negative) of affective representations. More recently, event-related
potential studies investigating how emotion words are processed as
a function of their concreteness have demonstrated differential
processing [17,18]. The relationship between the dimensions of
emotion and semantic size, however, has not to our knowledge
been explored.
In the current study, we first extended previous research by
examining the effects of semantic size on the recognition of
concrete as well as abstract words. Second, we explored the
relationship between semantic size and affective characteristics of
words (arousal and valence) as well as the impact of these variables
on lexical access. We hypothesized that responses would be faster
to words denoting bigger objects/concepts (e.g., elephant, paradise)
than to words denoting smaller objects/concepts (e.g., ornament,
intimate) when variables such as word frequency, age of acquisition,
and word length were controlled. This was supported by the
observed processing advantage for bigger (concrete) words [6] as
well as by a diverse literature which substantiates a ‘‘bigger is
better’’ perspective (see, e.g., [19–22]). We also hypothesized that
responses to concrete words would be faster than those to abstract
words (see, e.g., [23]). Finally, we hypothesized that size
representations of abstract concepts are more strongly tied to
affective experiences than those of concrete concepts. That is,
there should be a stronger link between semantic size and
emotionality for abstract rather than concrete words. We first
collected ratings on semantic size and affective characteristics for
concrete and abstract words denoting big or small objects/
concepts. Word recognition latencies were measured in a standard
lexical decision task.
Methods
All participants gave written informed consent and the
experimental procedure was approved by the College of Science
and Engineering Ethics Committee at the University of Glasgow.
Participants
Sixty (34 female; age range 18–43 years, M=22.75, SD=4.25)
members of the University of Glasgow community voluntarily
participated in this study. All were native English speakers, had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and had not been diagnosed
with any reading disorder.
Apparatus
The experiment was run on a Mac G4 (OS 9.0.4) computer,
using PsyScope 1.2.5 PPC software [24]. Letter strings were
presented on a Hansol 2100A 190 color monitor (120 Hz,
10246768 resolution) in 24-point Courier font (black letters on a
white background). Participants sat at a viewing distance of around
320 and approximately 3 letters subtended 1u of visual angle.
Responses were made via a PsyScope Button Box and RTs were
recorded with millisecond accuracy.
Table 1. Specifications of the experimental words with
standard deviations in parentheses.
Concrete Abstract
Big Small Big Small
N 55 55 55 55
Concreteness 86.79 (8.36) 89.48 (4.44) 33.15 (10.86) 37.05 (11.91)
Semantic Size 67.58 (9.42) 22.05 (9.86) 72.34 (8.48) 33.99 (12.48)
Arousal 50.53 (15.07) 37.02 (11.07) 66.00 (9.53) 41.14 (14.27)
Raw Valence 54.41 (13.29) 54.12 (12.63) 55.02 (29.76) 46.25 (16.93)
Absolute
Valence
33.77 (12.58) 28.72 (14.30) 62.55 (13.08) 37.15 (16.86)
Age of
Acquisition
30.28 (10.68) 30.68 (9.89) 49.52 (16.40) 47.27 (15.47)
Word
Frequency
29.10 (37.22) 29.83 (45.02) 27.25 (37.37) 26.94 (39.93)
Word Length 5.85 (1.25) 5.85 (1.25) 5.85 (1.25) 5.85 (1.25)
Ratings for the following factors were based on separate 100-point scales (low
to high): Concreteness (abstract to concrete), Semantic Size (small to large),
Arousal (unarousing to arousing), Raw Valence (negative to positive), and Age
of Acquisition (early to late). Absolute Valence was calculated via the following
transformations: (a) shifting the 0 to 100 scale to a 250 to +50 scale (to more
appropriately represent valence); (b) taking the absolute value of each rating
(resulting in a 50-point scale); and (c) doubling each value to obtain a 100-point
scale (from low to high unsigned valence). Word Frequency is expressed in
occurrences per million and Word Length in number of letters.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075000.t001
Table 2. Mean RTs (in ms) and %Error (with standard
deviations in parentheses) across experimental conditions.
Big Small
Concrete Abstract Concrete Abstract
RT 542 (63) 564 (70) 556 (77) 582 (78)
%Error 2.3 (2.2) 4.1 (3.2) 2.8 (2.8) 5.9 (5.1)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075000.t002
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Design and Materials
A 2 [Concreteness: Concrete vs. Abstract]62 [Size: Big vs.
Small] within-participant design was used. The experiment
comprised a total of 220 words ranging from 4–8 characters in
length. Half of the words had relatively concrete meanings (e.g.,
castle) while the other half had relatively abstract meanings (e.g.,
wealth). Within each Concreteness condition, half of the words
described relatively big objects or concepts (e.g., castle and wealth)
while the other half described relatively small objects or concepts
(e.g., pocket and unique).
Across all four conditions, words were matched on an item-by-
item basis for word frequency (occurrences per million) and word
length (number of letters). Word frequencies were obtained from
the British National Corpus (BNC), a database of 90 million
written word tokens (http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk). All word
stimuli are listed in Table S1. Nonwords comprised 220
pronounceable, orthographically legal pseudowords (e.g., zocker)
that were matched to word stimuli in terms of string length.
Ratings for all other psycholinguistic variables – concreteness,
semantic size, emotional arousal, emotional valence, age of
acquisition (AoA) – were collected from an independent sample
in a computer-based rating task using a visual analogue scale
(VAS). This was because such ratings for our stimulus set were not
always available in existing databases or, in the case of semantic
size, did not exist. We employed rating procedures similar to those
used in the literature. Our specific procedures, instructions, and
rating scales are detailed in Procedure S1. The specifications of
the psycholinguistic variables for our materials across conditions
are summarized in Table 1. Independent-samples t-tests run on
the Concreteness and Semantic Size ratings showed that,
subjectively, these manipulations were effective [Concreteness:
t(218) = 41.61, p,.001; Semantic Size: t(218) = 28.02, p,.001].
That is, Concrete words (M=88, SD=7) were rated as being
significantly more concrete than Abstract words (M=35, SD=12)
and Big words (M=70, SD=9) were rated as being significantly
bigger than Small words (M=28, SD=13).
Procedure
Participants were tested individually and the entire experiment
lasted around a half hour. They were given a consent form and
written instructions. They were told that half of the stimuli were
words and half were nonwords and that their task was to press the
corresponding response button as quickly and as accurately as
possible. Participants were first presented with a practice block of 8
trials to become accustomed to the procedure. Each trial began
with a blank screen for 1000 ms, followed by a centrally presented
fixation cross for 200 ms. The cross was then replaced by another
blank screen for 500 ms after which the letter string was presented
centrally until the participant responded. Word responses were
made using the right forefinger on the right (green) key of the
Button Box, labelled ‘‘W,’’ and nonword responses with the left
forefinger on the left (red) key, labelled ‘‘NW.’’ The experimental
trials (220 words and 220 pseudowords) were presented in a
different random order to each participant with three pro-
grammed breaks.
Results
Three different types of analyses were performed on the data. In
order to directly compare our results with those of Sereno et al.
[6], we first assessed the effects of Concreteness and Size via
within-participant analyses of variance (ANOVAs). We then
performed correlational and multiple regression analyses to better
understand the relationship between our factors of Concreteness
and Size and the emotional dimensions (arousal and valence) of
the stimuli. Finally, we employed moderated mediation analysis to
aid in determining the dynamic interrelationship among these
variables during word recognition.
Extending the Size Effect from Concrete to Abstract
Words
The mean RT and percent error (%Error) data (with standard
deviations) are presented in Table 2. Our initial analysis adopted
the same methods employed by Sereno et al. [6] so that direct
comparisons could be made. After removing error trials (3.8%
over all trials), the RT data were subjected to two trimming
procedures (with an additional data loss of 1.9%). Items with RTs
longer than 1500 ms or shorter than 250 ms were first excluded.
For each participant in each condition, items having RTs beyond
two standard deviations were additionally excluded. These
procedures (error and outlier removal) resulted in an average
RT data loss of 5.7% per participant.
For RT and %Error data, 2 [Concreteness: Concrete vs.
Abstract]62 [Size: Big vs. Small] ANOVAs were performed both
by participants (F1) and by items (F2). For RT, the main effects of
Concreteness and Size were both significant [Concreteness:
F1(1,59) = 90.92, p,0.001, Cohen’s f=1.24; F2(1,54) = 47.91,
p,0.001, Cohen’s f= .89; minF9(1,100) = 31.37, p,.001; Size:
F1(1,59) = 33.16, p,0.001, Cohen’s f= .75; F2(1,54) = 20.40,
p,0.001, Cohen’s f= .61; minF9(1,105) = 12.63, p,.001]. As
expected, responses to Concrete words (549 ms) were faster than
those to Abstract words (573 ms); responses to Big words (553 ms)
were faster than those to Small words (569 ms). The Concrete-
ness6Size interaction was not significant [Fs,1]. Thus, the
processing advantage for Big over Small words was equally
pronounced for Concrete and Abstract words. For %Error, as with
Table 3. Linear regression on semantic Size with Arousal,
Absolute Valence, and their interaction term as predictors.
B 95% CI p r VIF
Arousal 17.228 [14.089 20.367] ,0.001 0.732 2.096
Absolute Valence 0.565 [22.562 3.692] 0.722 0.534 2.080
Arousal6Absolute
Valence
20.925 [23.185 1.335] 0.421 0.161 1.086
Reported are the slopes (Bs) for each regressor, their associated 95% confidence
intervals (CIs), and p-values. Also shown are their zero-order correlation
coefficients (rs) and variance inflation factors (VIFs; a VIF indexes the extent to
which the variance of an estimated regression coefficient is increased because
of collinearity).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075000.t003
Table 4. Linear regression on semantic Size with
Concreteness, Arousal, and their interaction as predictors.
B 95% CI p r VIF
Concreteness .746 [21.608 3.100] 0.533 20.256 1.177
Arousal 17.682 [15.287 20.077] ,0.001 0.732 1.218
Concreteness6
Arousal
.041 [22.170 2.252] 0.971 20.138 1.038
Reported are the slopes (Bs) for each regressor, their associated 95% confidence
intervals (CIs), and p-values. Also shown are their zero-order correlation
coefficients (rs) and variance inflation factors (VIFs).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075000.t004
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the RT data, both main effects were significant [Concreteness:
F1(1,59) = 52.24, p,0.001, Cohen’s f= .94; F2(1,54) = 10.90,
p,0.01, Cohen’s f= .45; minF9(1,76) = 9.02, p,.01; Size:
F1(1,59) = 9.50, p,0.01, Cohen’s f= .40; F2(1,54) = 7.09, p,0.05,
Cohen’s f= .36; minF9(1,109) = 4.06, p,.05]. Participants made
fewer errors in response to Concrete (2.6%) and Big (3.2%) words
in contrast to Abstract (5.0%) and Small (4.4%) words, respec-
tively. Although the interaction was significant by participants
[F1(1,59) = 5.25, p,0.05], it was not by items [F2(1,54) = 1.18,
p.0.25; minF9(1,77) = .96, p..30].
Overall, our results consistently showed (orthogonal) processing
advantages for Concrete over Abstract and for semantically Big
over Small words. These advantages were reflected in faster
recognition times and higher accuracy rates. The main effect of
Concreteness is in line with past literature demonstrating that
concrete words are generally processed faster than abstract words
(e.g., [23,25–27]). Likewise, the main effect of Size replicated
previous findings by Sereno et al. [6]. While their stimuli were
limited to concrete words, we found the same pattern of effects
with abstract words.
The questions remain, however, as to why bigness confers a
processing advantage to abstract concepts and what this might
entail in terms of the nature of their underlying representations. As
mentioned earlier, abstract concepts cannot be embodied in the
same way as concrete objects in visuo-spatial modalities. To
resolve this paradox, we conducted a series of correlation and
regression analyses investigating the relationships between seman-
tic size and emotion and how they might influence lexical access.
Establishing the Relationships between Size,
Concreteness, and Emotion
Size, arousal, valence, and concreteness. In our word
specifications (Table 1), Big words tended to have higher
emotionality (Arousal and Absolute Valence) than Small words.
We explored the relationships between these variables by initially
regressing Size on Arousal, Absolute Valence, and the Arousal6
Absolute Valence interaction. The results are summarized in
Table 3. We found that Arousal was the only significant predictor
of Size (we obtained similar results when using Raw Valence
values). We thus focused on Arousal as the dimension that may
carry information about the size of concepts.
Next we examined whether the correlation between Size and
Arousal varied as a function of Concreteness. We hypothesized
that representations of size for abstract words may be more
strongly grounded in introspections and emotions. Such grounding
may be weaker in concrete words as an object’s size is presumably
linked more directly to visuo-spatial representations. We conduct-
ed a regression on Size with Concreteness, Arousal, and their
interaction as predictors. The results are summarized in Table 4.
Overall, it showed that the correlation between Size and Arousal
was not significantly moderated by Concreteness.
The Size-Arousal correlation supported our hypothesis that the
semantic size of abstract concepts may be represented via
emotional content. It was, however, unexpected that the size
associated with concrete words was correlated with emotional
arousal to a similar extent, as we had originally assumed that the
size of concrete objects is grounded in visuo-spatial representa-
tions. Theoretically, such a Size-Arousal correlation for concrete
entities could imply two types of relationships. One possibility is
that Size and Arousal share a representational nature and that the
Table 5. Multiple regression results.
Predictor B 95% CI p FDR R2(%) 95% CI (%) VIF
Concreteness 211.534 [215.019 28.157] 0 1 0.75 [0.50 1.07] 2.081
Size 211.684 [216.707 26.859] 0 1 0.72 [0.52 0.93] 3.052
Arousal 24.347 [28.738 0.031] 0.052 0.48 [0.31 0.67] 2.789
Concreteness6Size 0.131 [23.776 4.250] 0.948 0.45 [0.30 0.61] 2.737
Concreteness6Arousal 2.365 [21.488 6.227] 0.234 0.45 [0.31 0.60] 2.261
Size6Arousal 2.926 [20.172 5.974] 0.063 0.49 [0.33 0.67] 1.286
Concreteness6Size6Arousal 26.780 [210.161 23.451] 0 1 0.44 [0.31 0.58] 2.243
Intercept 582.736
Reported are the slopes (Bs) for each regressor, the associated 95% confidence intervals (CIs), p-values, and whether they survived the False Discovery Rate (FDR)
correction (p,0.05) for multiple comparison (significant effects are marked with 1s). Also reported are the regressors’ semi-partial correlation coefficients (R2s), the
associated 95% CIs, and variance inflation factors (VIFs).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075000.t005
Table 6. Summary of the Size effects (slopes) at putative high and low levels of Concreteness and Arousal.
Predictor B (Size) 95% CI p Intercept
‘‘Concrete’’ ‘‘Low’’ Arousal (M2SD) 27.699 [212.754 22.745] 0.002 573.184
(M+SD) ‘‘High’’ Arousal (M+SD) 215.406 [223.115 28.134] ,0.001 569.220
‘‘Abstract’’ ‘‘Low’’ Arousal (M2SD) 221.521 [231.056 212.118] ,0.001 600.982
(M2SD) ‘‘High’’ Arousal (M+SD) 22.109 [210.580 6.079] 0.628 587.559
Reported are the slopes (Bs) for each regressor, the associated 95% confidence intervals (CIs), p-values, and intercepts.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075000.t006
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concept of size may be represented in the form of emotional
arousal, in the same way we have stipulated for abstract concepts.
The other is that Size and Arousal are two independent constructs
that are linked. That is, the activation of size representations (e.g.,
visuo-spatial representations) during lexical access of concrete
objects elicits a subsequent emotional response of arousal. This
would also result in a significant correlation between the two.
We reasoned that one way to distinguish between these two
underlying relationships is to examine the effects of Size and
Arousal on word recognition latencies. The first account (H1)
assumes that Arousal underlies the semantic representations of
Size and, hence, should be activated during lexical access. It
predicts that Arousal should index the relative speed of word
recognition interchangeably with Size. The second account (H2)
posits that emotional arousal is elicited subsequently after lexical
access. It predicts that Arousal should affect word recognition
latencies independently from Size. To test these accounts, we carried
out multiple regression analyses and examined the effects of Size
and Arousal on RTs.
Effects of size and arousal on word recognition
latencies. Data preparation involved first removing trials with
incorrect responses (3.76% of the data) and then those with RTs
longer than 1500 ms or shorter than 250 ms (a further 0.99% of
the data). In total, 12573 trials (95.25% of the data) were
submitted to the multiple regression analyses.
We conducted the multiple regressions in two rounds to account
for between-participant variability. A first round of analyses was
performed to assess individual participants’ sensitivity to the lexical
Table 7. Multiple regression results using a median split of Concreteness.
Predictor B 95% CI p FDR R2(%) 95% CI (%) VIF
Size 211.240 216.400 26.341 0.000 1 1.21 0.80 1.66 2.269
Concrete Arousal 21.065 25.117 3.043 0.576 0.72 0.50 0.99 2.328
words Size6Arousal 21.047 24.917 2.877 0.604 0.91 0.60 1.27 1.083
Intercept 570.114
Size 27.810 215.342 20.216 0.044 1.09 0.77 1.45 2.269
Abstract Arousal 27.240 215.138 0.606 0.064 1.17 0.83 1.54 2.328
words Size6Arousal 5.043 1.433 8.783 0.004 1 0.84 0.60 1.14 1.083
Intercept 595.721
Reported are the slopes (Bs) for each regressor, the associated 95% confidence intervals (CIs), p-values, and whether they survived the False Discovery Rate (FDR)
correction (p,0.05) for multiple comparison (significant effects are marked with 1s). Also reported are the regressors’ semi-partial correlation coefficients (R2s), the
associated 95% CIs, and variance inflation factors (VIFs).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075000.t007
Figure 1. The Concreteness6Size6Arousal interaction. The left panel illustrates the Size6Arousal interaction at a high concreteness rating
level (M+SD). The right panel illustrates the same interaction but at a low concreteness level (M2SD). The dotted lines with circles at both ends
represent a low arousal level (M2SD). The solid lines with diamonds at both ends represent high arousal level (M+SD). The slopes of the two lines
indicate the strength and direction of the Size effects on RTs at the different levels of Arousal.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075000.g001
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variables included in the model. We used a full regression model
investigating all possible main effects and interactions between
Concreteness, Size, and Arousal. The regression results are
presented in Table 5. We standardized the variables to minimize
multicollinearity and computed the corresponding variance
inflation factors (VIFs) as collinearity diagnostics. Regression
weights (Bs) index the strength of each regressor (main effects or
interaction term) on participants’ response times. Steeper slopes
imply that RTs are modulated to a greater extent by these lexical
variables individually and/or interactively. We also calculated
semi-partial correlation coefficients to estimate the effect size of
each regressor. As the slopes and the semi-partial correlation
coefficients for each regressor had been calculated for each
participant, a second round of analyses was then carried out to
assess whether these slopes (i.e., correlation strengths) and semi-
partial correlation coefficients (i.e., correlation relevance) were
consistently different from zero across all 60 subjects. We
performed a percentile bootstrap with alpha set to 0.05 using
5000 samples with replacement to calculate the 95% confidence
intervals (CIs) and associated p-values [28].
In line with our ANOVA results, we observed significant main
effects of Concreteness and Size. Both main effects displayed
negative effects on RTs – that is, RTs were faster with higher
values of either Concreteness or Size (i.e., more concrete or
semantically bigger words). There was also a significant Concrete-
ness 6 Size 6 Arousal interaction. We initially explored this
interaction by observing the Size6Arousal interaction at putative
high and low concreteness levels (i.e., ‘‘concrete’’ and ‘‘abstract’’
words, with concreteness ratings of M+SD and M-SD, respective-
ly). The Size effects were reflected in the slopes (Bs) at putative
‘‘high’’ (M+SD) and ‘‘low’’ (M2SD) arousal levels. The results are
summarized in Table 6 and illustrated in Figure 1. Size effects
were consistently robust in all conditions except for ‘‘abstract’’
words of ‘‘high’’ arousal.
To statistically assess the significance of the Size 6 Arousal
interaction in concrete and abstract words, a median split of the
RT data based on Concreteness was taken, and the same
regression analysis was performed on RTs with Size, Arousal,
and the Size 6 Arousal interaction as predictors of RTs. These
results are summarized in Table 7. At lower levels of concrete-
ness, there was a significant Size6Arousal interaction. The main
effect of Size, however, did not survive the FDR correction. At
higher levels of concreteness, only the main effect of Size was
significant.
Overall, the results showed that, for abstract words, Size and
Arousal influenced word recognition latencies interactively.
Specifically, the Size effect was salient at lower levels of arousal,
but was masked at higher levels (Figure 1, right panel). Critically,
Size and Arousal appeared to act competitively. Such a result
pattern favors our first hypothesis (see H1) to account for the
correlation between Size and Arousal which suggests that Size and
Arousal share a common representational nature. In contrast, for
concrete words, Size alone influenced lexical access, although the
Size effect was numerically enhanced with higher levels of arousal
(Figure 1, left panel). This pattern was in line with our second
hypothesis (see H2) which suggests that Arousal is an independent
construct that can be subsequently elicited by the activation of
visuo-spatial (Size) representations and, hence, does not directly
drive lexical access. To further validate these speculations, we
carried out a series of moderated mediation analyses.
Evaluating the Contributions of Arousal to the Size Effect
in Concrete and Abstract Words
Mediation, or an indirect effect, is a mechanism or process
underlying an observable relationship between a dependent
variable Y and an independent variable X where the effects of X
are transmitted by a mediator M onto Y. In other words, X predicts
Y because X affects M and M affects Y. Moderated mediation (i.e.,
a conditional indirect effect) refers to a mediation effect that is
dependent on different levels of a moderator W. If the moderator W
were gender (with levels male and female), an example of
moderated mediation would be that M mediates XRY in males
but not in females (for an explanation of moderated mediation, see
[29,30]).
The current moderated mediation analyses employed the
bootstrapping technique of Hayes ([31]; PROCESS macro Beta
release 130612, Models 5, 7, and 14). The three models under
testing, presented in Figure 2, were based on a simple mediation
model (Figure 2A; Model 4 in PROCESS) in which Size has a
direct effect on RTs and an indirect effect on RTs via Arousal. We
probed the moderation (i.e., conditional) effect of Concreteness
(CnC) on the direct pathway from SizeRRTs (Model 5;
Figure 2B), as well as on the indirect pathways, from
SizeRArousal (Model 7; Figure 2C) and from ArousalRRTs
(Model 14; Figure 2D). Recall, we hypothesized that Size effects
on RTs may be mediated via Arousal in Abstract but not in
Concrete words. Thus, we predicted that the Concreteness
moderation effects should mostly likely be observed on the path
ArousalRRTs (Model 14) and possibly on the path SizeRRTs
(Model 5). It would unlikely be observed on path SizeRArousal
Figure 2. Schematic illustrations of the moderated mediation
models [29,30] under testing. Panel A illustrates the basic mediation
model where Size can either directly or indirectly influence RTs via
Arousal. Panel B, C, and D illustrate three possibilities where
Concreteness (CnC) can moderate the direct or indirect effect of Size
on RTs. The relative spatial layout does not imply an absolute time
frame for processing. Our analyses lend greatest support to Model 14
(Panel D).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075000.g002
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(Model 7) as it was already demonstrated that Size was consistently
predicted by Arousal independent of Concreteness (see Table 4).
The data preparation was identical to that used in our multiple
regression analyses and valid trials were submitted to PROCESS.
The PROCESS macro was run on IBM SPSS Statistics 20. We
employed 10,000 bootstrap re-samples with bias-corrected and
bias-accelerated 95% confidence intervals (CIs) as recommended.
Variables were centered before constructing the interaction terms
to minimize multicollinearity.
The results are summarized in Table 8 and the conditional
effects are displayed in Figure 3. Overall, the results showed that
the direct effect of SizeRRTs was significant in all three models
(ts,23.07, ps,0.003). In Model 5 (Figure 2B, Figure 3A), this
direct effect was significant at all levels of Concreteness (all CIs did
not include 0), suggesting that it was not moderated by the latter.
The indirect effects of SizeRArousalRRTs were significant when
the CIs did not contain 0 [30]. Specifically, for Model 7
(Figure 2C, Figure 3B), this indirect effect was not significant
at any level of Concreteness (all CIs included 0). Hence, the
posited moderation of the SizeRArousal segment by Concreteness
was not supported. In contrast, for Model 14 (Figure 2D,
Figure 3C), Concreteness moderated the indirect effect of
SizeRArousalRRTs. The indirect effect was significant in
Abstract words (i.e., at the 10th and 25th percentile of the
Concreteness distribution, the CIs did not contain 0), but not in
Concrete words (i.e., at the 50th, 75th and 90th percentile of the
Concreteness distribution, the CIs did include 0). In moderated
mediation analyses, this kind of conditional indirect effect indicates
the existence of a moderation effect [30].
The moderated mediation analyses indicated that semantic size
of words directly influences lexical access speed in both Concrete
and Abstract words. In the latter, this Size effect was also partially
mediated through Arousal, thereby affecting lexical access
indirectly. These results complemented our regression data and
suggested again that in Abstract words, semantic size may be
partially represented in emotional arousal, whereas in Concrete
words, size may elicit activation of emotional arousal post-lexically
(see Figure 2D and Figure 3C).
Discussion
The current study examined whether semantic size of concrete
as well as abstract words influenced their recognition speed in a
lexical decision task. Results showed that words denoting bigger
objects or concepts were recognized significantly faster than those
indicating a smaller semantic size, irrespective of the concreteness
of the entities. Regression analyses additionally revealed that
semantic size was highly correlated with subjective ratings of
emotional arousal. Our moderated mediation analysis, however,
demonstrated that the effects of arousal contributed more centrally
to the recognition of abstract in comparison to concrete words.
Overall, the present results replicated the previous findings by
Sereno et al. [6] using a larger stimulus set (220 vs. 90 words) and
extended the scope of semantic size from concrete objects to
Table 8. Results for moderated mediation analyses by model.
Model 5 Effect SE CI low CI high t p
10th Percentile 20.477 0.155 20.781 20.172 23.071 0.002
Direct effect 25th Percentile 20.468 0.139 20.740 20.197 23.381 0.001
(SizeRRTs) 50th Percentile 20.436 0.094 20.620 20.252 24.640 0.000
75th Percentile 20.412 0.100 20.607 20.216 24.132 0.000
90th Percentile 20.409 0.102 20.609 20.210 24.016 0.000
Indirect effect 20.129 0.074 20.274 0.015
Model 7 Effect SE CI low CI high t p
Direct effect 20.469 0.092 20.648 20.289 25.111 0.000
10th Percentile 0.110 0.092 20.067 0.291
Indirect effect 25th Percentile 0.103 0.086 20.062 0.271
(SizeRArousal
RRTs)
50th Percentile 0.074 0.062 20.045 0.195
75th Percentile 0.052 0.044 20.032 0.139
90th Percentile 0.050 0.042 20.031 0.134
Model 14 Effect SE CI low CI high t p
Direct effect 20.427 0.091 20.607 20.248 24.676 0.000
10th Percentile 20.190 0.094 20.374 20.005
Indirect effect 25th Percentile 20.176 0.084 20.343 20.010
(SizeRArousal
RRTs)
50th Percentile 20.124 0.072 20.264 0.021
75th Percentile 20.085 0.091 20.259 0.098
90th Percentile 20.082 0.093 20.261 0.105
Reported are the Effects (beta values), the bootstrap-estimated Standard Errors (SEs), and the lower and higher boundaries of the bootstrap-estimated Confidence
Intervals (CIs). t- and p-values are also reported for direct effects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075000.t008
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abstract concepts. The present results are compatible with the
embodied cognition framework (e.g., [8]) in which cognition is
grounded in bodily states, sensory-motor simulations, and situated
action. Much research has demonstrated that language compre-
hension of concrete meanings leads to activation of associated
sensory-motor cortices at both a lexical level (e.g., [32–34]) and a
sentence/discourse level (e.g., [35–38]). Processing of concrete
words should, by these mechanisms, lead to activation of
associated visuo-spatial representations. Such representations
may be accessed relatively faster in words denoting bigger objects
[10], thereby resulting in a processing advantage over words
denoting smaller objects.
With respect to abstract words, Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings
[11] proposed that abstract concepts and meanings are grounded
in introspective states. They explored this idea by asking
participants to generate features for highly concrete words (e.g.,
bird, car, sofa), highly abstract words (e.g., truth, freedom, invention),
and intermediate words (e.g., cooking, farming, carpeting). They found
that features for abstract concepts focused more on introspective
and social content than on physical settings. Kousta et al. [12]
further proposed that the lack of mappings from abstract words to
the physical world may be complemented by mappings to the
internal world in the form of affective associations. The present
study can provide a substantive example of affective grounding for
abstract words. Specifically, we showed that the semantic size of
abstract concepts was partially grounded in emotional arousal and
was automatically accessed during word recognition.
The question remains, however, as to why big abstract concepts
are recognized faster. It is evident that emotion words are
generally processed faster (e.g., [12,39,40]). Activation of higher
arousal during word recognition may trigger a higher level of
alertness and attention, resulting in faster response times.
Nevertheless, this cannot fully account for the size effect on
recognition latencies in abstract words. The direct effect of size
remained significant regardless of its mediated pathway via
arousal. Thus, while abstract size is partially represented in arousal,
it may also be coded in other forms of representations, for
example, the situational events and introspections that are
associated with abstract meanings as suggested by Barsalou and
Wiemer-Hastings [11]. Bigger concepts (e.g., disaster) tend to
comprise a ‘‘bigger’’ range of introspective, social, and situational
associations than smaller concepts (e.g., incident). Access to a richer
network of semantic information grants bigger concepts a
cognitive advantage over smaller concepts in word recognition
(see also [23], for the context availability model and a similar
contrast between concrete and abstract words). It is possible then
to account for a significant direct effect of size in terms of such
variations in the scale and density of semantic networks. Future
research could test these speculations by examining the distribu-
tion of neural activity across the cortex during the processing of big
versus small abstract words.
Figure 3. Illustrations of the moderation (conditional) effect of
Concreteness by model. The solid red line represents the mean
effect of Size across values of Concreteness. The five filled circles
correspond to the mean Size effect at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th
percentiles of the Concreteness ratings (see also Table 8). The upper
and lower dotted lines represent the 95% confidence intervals around
the means. The curves were fit using 3rd and 4th degree polynomial
functions. A horizontal line crossing the 0 value on the y-axis is
displayed as a reference point to visualize the significance of the effect.
Panels A, B, and C correspond to Models 5, 7, and 14 (and Panels B, C,
and D of Figure 2), respectively. The data pattern lends greatest support
to Model 14 (Panel C).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075000.g003
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In a broader context, the current study also highlights the
distinction between intrinsically and extrinsically emotional words.
The former expresses or implies an emotional state (e.g., panic)
while the latter elicits one (e.g., shark). Although affective
characteristics can be similarly attributed to both categories of
words, their role during lexical access may differ. That is, affective
features are, by definition, more an integrated part of the semantic
representations of intrinsically emotional words and more a
semantic consequence of accessing extrinsically emotional words.
Emotional attributes of words, hence, do not always index lexical
access. This may account for the mixed results on affective word
processing. In the emotion word literature, some studies demon-
strate a processing advantage for positive over neutral words (e.g.,
[39–42]), some show an advantage for negative over neutral words
(e.g., [17,41,43]), and others observe an advantage for positive
over negative words (e.g., [44–46]). Such variability could
potentially be due to differences in the ratio of intrinsically and
extrinsically emotional words presented. Future research on
affective word processing may consider explicitly distinguishing
between the two types of words.
Conclusions
Our results suggest that semantic size is automatically accessed
when visually reading a word. Words having larger semantic sizes
are activated more quickly for both concrete and abstract words.
Although semantic size is highly correlated with emotional arousal,
its effect was mediated via arousal in abstract but not in concrete
words. This suggests that emotional arousal is an integrated part of
semantic size in abstract words but may be elicited post-lexically
by semantic size in concrete words. Further investigations of the
mental representations of semantic size can use alternative
measures such as eye movements during reading to rule out task
effects or event-related brain potentials or BOLD signals during
single word presentation to explore its underlying neural bases.
Supporting Information
Table S1 Word stimuli across conditions.
(DOCX)
Table S2 The five rating scales. For each scale, the
definition of each variable given in the instructions and the
associated labels (from left to right) of each rating scale are
indicated.
(DOCX)
Procedure S1 Word rating task.
(DOCX)
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: BY MES PJO SCS. Performed
the experiments: SCS. Analyzed the data: BY MV MW SCS. Contributed
reagents/materials/analysis tools: BY SCS. Wrote the paper: BY SCS.
References
1. Bonner JT (2006) Why size matters: From bacteria to blue whales. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
2. Roduner E (2006) Size matters: Why nanomaterials are different. Chemical
Society Reviews 35: 583–592. doi:10.1039/b502142c.
3. Beattie G, Shovelton H (1999) Mapping the range of information contained in the
iconic hand gestures that accompany spontaneous speech. Journal of Language
and Social Psychology 18: 438–462. doi:10.1177/0261927X99018004005.
4. Konkle T, Oliva A (2012) A real-world size organization of object responses in
occipitotemporal cortex. Neuron 74: 1114–1124. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.
04.036.
5. Rubinsten O, Henik A (2002) Is an ant larger than a lion? Acta Psychologica
111: 141–154.
6. Sereno SC, O’Donnell PJ, Sereno ME (2009) Size matters: Bigger is faster.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 62: 1115–1122. doi:10.1080/
17470210802618900.
7. Sereno SC, O’Donnell PJ, Sereno ME (2011) Erratum. Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology 64: 1872.
8. Barsalou LWW (1999) Perceptual symbol systems. The Behavioral and brain
sciences 22: 577–609; discussion 610–60.
9. Murray SO, Boyaci H, Kersten D (2006) The representation of perceived
angular size in human primary visual cortex. Nature Neuroscience 9: 429–434.
doi:10.1038/nn1641.
10. Sereno ME (1993) Neural computation of pattern motion: Modeling stages of
motion analysis in the primate visual cortex. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
11. Barsalou LW, Wiemer-Hastings K (2005) Situating abstract concepts. In: Pecher
D, Zwaan R, editors. Grounding cognition: The role of perception and action in
memory, language, and thought. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp.
129–163.
12. Kousta S-T, Vigliocco G, Vinson DP, Andrews M, Del Campo E (2011) The
representation of abstract words: Why emotion matters. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General 140: 14–34. doi:10.1037/a0021446.
13. Russell JA (1980) A circumplex model of affect. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 39: 1161–1178. doi:10.1037/h0077714.
14. Lang PJ, Greenwald MK, Bradley MM, Hamm AO (1993) Looking at pictures:
Affective, facial, visceral, and behavioral reactions. Psychophysiology 30: 261–
273. doi:10.1111/j.1469–8986.1993.tb03352.x.
15. Osgood CE, Suci GJ, Tannenbaum PH (1957) The measurement of meaning.
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
16. Bradley MM, Lang PJ (1999) Affective norms for English words (ANEW):
Instruction manual and affective ratings. Technical Report C-1, The Center for
Research in Psychophysiology, University of Florida.
17. Kanske P, Kotz SA (2007) Concreteness in emotional words: ERP evidence from
a hemifield study. Brain Research 1148: 138–148. doi:10.1016/j.brainres.
2007.02.044.
18. Palazova M, Sommer W, Schacht A (2013) Interplay of emotional valence and
concreteness in word processing: An event-related potential study with verbs.
Brain and Language 125: 264–271. doi:10.1016/j.bandl.2013.02.008.
19. Tinbergen N, Perdeck AC (1950) On the stimulus situation releasing the begging
response in the newly hatched herring gull chick (Larus a. argentatus Pont.).
Behaviour 3: 1–39.
20. Bruner JS, Goodman CC (1947) Value and need as organizing factors in
perception. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 42: 33–44.
21. Fischer MH (2001) Number processing induces spatial performance biases.
Neurology 57: 822–826.
22. Greenberg J (1966) Language universals, with special reference to feature
hierarchies. The Hague: Mouton.
23. Schwanenflugel PJ, Harnishfeger KK, Stowe RW (1988) Context availability
and lexical decisions for abstract and concrete words. Journal of Memory and
Language 27: 499–520. doi:10.1016/0749-596X(88)90022-8.
24. Cohen J, MacWhinney B, Flatt M, Provost J (1993) PsyScope: An interactive
graphic system for designing and controlling experiments in the psychology
laboratory using Macintosh computers. Behavior Research Methods, Instru-
ments, & Computers 25: 257–271. doi:10.3758/BF03204507.
25. Rubin DC (1980) 51 properties of 125 words: A unit analysis of verbal behavior.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 19: 736–755.
26. Whaley CP (1978) Word-nonword classification time. Journal of Verbal
Learning and Verbal Behavior 17: 143–154.
27. James CT (1975) The role of semantic information in lexical decisions. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1: 130–136.
28. Wilcox RR (2005) Introduction to robust estimation and hypothesis testing.
Elsevier Academic Press.
29. Muller D, Judd CM, Yzerbyt VY (2005) When moderation is mediated and
mediation is moderated. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 89: 852–
863. doi:10.1037/0022–3514.89.6.852.
30. Preacher KJ, Rucker DD, Hayes AF (2007) Addressing moderated mediation
hypotheses: Theory, methods, and prescriptions. Multivariate Behavioral
Research 42: 185–227. doi:10.1080/00273170701341316.
31. Hayes AF (2012) PROCESS: A versatile computational tool for observed
variable mediation, moderation, and conditional process modeling. Retrieved
from http://www.afhayes.com/public/process2012.pdf.
32. Pulvermu¨ller F (2005) Brain mechanisms linking language and action. Nature
Reviews Neuroscience 6: 576–582. doi:Doi 10.1038/Nrn1706.
33. Pulvermu¨ller F (1999) Words in the brain’s language. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 22: 253–336.
34. Kiefer M, Sim EJ, Herrnberger B, Grothe J, Hoenig K (2008) The sound of
concepts: Four markers for a link between auditory and conceptual brain
systems. Journal of Neuroscience 28: 12224–12230. doi:10.1523/jneurosci.
3579-08.2008.
Semantic Size of Abstract Concepts
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 September 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e75000
35. Tettamanti M, Buccino G, Saccuman MC, Gallese V, Danna M, et al. (2005)
Listening to action-related sentences activates fronto-parietal motor circuits. Journal
of Cognitive Neuroscience 17: 273–281. doi:10.1162/0898929053124965.
36. Yao B, Belin P, Scheepers C (2011) Silent reading of direct versus indirect speech
activates voice-selective areas in the auditory cortex. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience 23: 3146–3152. doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00022.
37. Yao B, Belin P, Scheepers C (2012) Brain ‘‘talks over’’ boring quotes: Top-down
activation of voice-selective areas while listening to monotonous direct speech
quotations. NeuroImage 60: 1832–1842. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.01.111.
38. Speer NK, Reynolds JR, Swallow KM, Zacks JM (2009) Reading stories
activates neural representations of visual and motor experiences. Psychological
Science 20: 989–999.
39. Scott GG, O’Donnell PJ, Sereno SC (2012) Emotion words affect eye fixations
during reading. Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning, Memory, and
Cognition 38: 783–792. doi:10.1037/a0027209.
40. Scott GG, O’Donnell PJ, Leuthold H, Sereno SC (2009) Early emotion word
processing: Evidence from event-related potentials. Biological Psychology 80:
95–104. doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2008.03.010.
41. Kousta S-T, Vinson DP, Vigliocco G (2009) Emotion words, regardless of
polarity, have a processing advantage over neutral words. Cognition 112: 473–
481. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.007.
42. Kakolewski KE, Crowson Jr JJ, Sewell KW, Cromwell RL (1999) Laterality,
word valence, and visual attention: A comparison of depressed and non-
depressed individuals. International Journal of Psychophysiology 34: 283–292.
43. Schacht A, Sommer W (2009) Time course and task dependence of emotion
effects in word processing. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience 9:
28–43. doi:10.3758/CABN.9.1.28.
44. Estes Z, Verges M (2008) Freeze or flee? Negative stimuli elicit selective
responding. Cognition 108: 557–565. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.003.
45. Atchley RA, Ilardi SS, Enloe A (2003) Hemispheric asymmetry in the processing
of emotional content in word meanings: The effect of current and past
depression. Brain and Language 84: 105–119.
46. Dahl M (2001) Asymmetries in the processing of emotionally valenced words.
Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 42: 97–104.
Semantic Size of Abstract Concepts
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 September 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e75000
View publication stats
